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Is Jakarta's Polisi Daerah (Polda) Metro Jaya the only regional police station in the 
world to be glorified with its very own coffee-table book? Released in 2005, the book 
celebrates renovations to the station that commenced a year earlier. On page ten, the 
photo of the station from Metro Jaya's main western entry on the Jend. Sudirman 
motorway takes up the whole page. The photo shows the fagade of stern gray cement 
and polished glass, framed by spouting fountains and date palms. This vision of 
tropical security chic is Polda Metro Jaya's idea of the proper setting for a professional, 
civil police force charged with securing newly democratic Indonesia. But in observing 
the photo, one's eyes are drawn upwards to the right-hand corner, where a squat, gray 
skyscraper overshadows the station, crowned with these golden initials: GY.
This is Griya Yatra.2 Griya Yatra is a conglomerate that has grown substantially 
since the demise of the New Order. GY owns the slab of land adjacent to Polda Metro
1 The author thanks Joshua Barker, Edward Aspinall, and Indonesia's readers and editors for their critical 
assessment of drafts of this essay. Earlier versions of this paper also benefited from comments and 
criticisms from participants at KITLV and the ANU's Indonesia Study Group seminars. The author 
gratefully acknowledges the John Monash Foundation for its generous support of this research.
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Jaya known as the Sudirman Central Business District (SCBD) development, whose 
central coordinates make it one of the most lucrative pieces of real estate in the capital. 
In the city, talking about "GY" is often code for talking about its owner, "TO," a 
peranakan2 3 entrepreneur named Tony Oei. In fact, however, GY is jointly owned by Oei 
and Alex Guo, an older totok businessman. This pair is said to be like brothers. 
Although neither comes from Java, together they have forged the conglomerate's 
identity by baptizing it in Javanese. Griya Yatra means "house of money."
The release of the coffee-table book followed months of media speculation as to the 
source of the estimated Rp 660 billion needed to pay for the renovations. Metro Jaya 
had started work on new buildings for Densus 88 (the recently formed anti-terrorist 
squad) and the mobile brigade (Brimob). There was to be a glossy auditorium, the 
three-story Al-Kautsar mosque, a five-story car park, new boarding houses for the 
officers, and refurbished official residences for elite officers.4 With no funds allocated 
from the 2004—05 state budget (APBN, Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara), and 
no supplementary funds proposed to parliament, Indonesians and their legislative 
representatives wondered where Jakarta's regional police chief (Kapolda Metro Jaya) 
Inspector General (Irjen pol.) Firman Gan had obtained the money to pay for the 
station's renovations and improvements.
The head of Polri's (Indonesian National Police, Kepolisian Negara Republik 
Indonesia) General Oversight Inspectorate (Irawasum, Inspektur Pengawasan Umum), 
Komjen (Commissioner General) Binarto, tried to address the matter by conducting a 
review. He concluded that because no public funds had been used, no public funds 
had been misappropriated.5 National Police Chief (Kapolri) General Dai Bachtiar then 
stepped in with the claim that, although some of the funds had been allocated from the 
Additional Expenditure Budget (ABT, Anggaran Belanja Tambahan), a statement 
quickly negated by Komisi III (National Parliamentary Commission III for Law, 
Human Rights, and Security; it provides parliamentary oversight of Polri), ongoing 
underfunding of the police by the state meant that Jakarta's regional police chief was 
forced to rely on community donations, that is, "off-budget" funds. However, Bachtiar 
was careful to emphasize that such monies were not obtained willy-nilly. Off-budget 
revenue-raising was ethically bound. Bachtiar insisted that police only accepted 
donations from patrons who were sincere and wholehearted (ikhlas). If it transpired
2 Pseudonyms have been allocated to Griya Yatra and all of the people and companies associated with it. 
The military and police businesses named in this article are all real, as are the other companies and their 
owners cited in this article.
3 Peranakan are ethnic Chinese Indonesians who are considered to have mixed blood, limited use for ethnic 
Chinese dialects, and an "assimilated Indonesian-ethnic Chinese" identity. Peranakan are contrasted with 
totok, who speak an ethnic Chinese dialect, practice everyday Confucianism, and tend to congregate only 
with other totok. The terms emerged originally during Dutch colonial rule, during peak periods of ethnic 
Chinese migration, as temporal and relational markers of belonging, though both groups claimed 
superiority. Contemporary use and identification continues to rest on facial characteristics, religious 
persuasion, and language use.
4 Koran Tempo, "Ada Kesalahan Administrasi dalam Pembangunan Gedung Detasemen 88," February 15, 
2005, http: / /koran.tempo.co/konten/2005/02/16/ 33582/ Ada-Kesalahan-Administrasi-dalam- 
Pembangunan-Gedung-Detasemen-88, accessed September 6, 2013.
5 Ibid.
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that Metro Jaya had extorted the donations, well then, that would be a disgrace
(tercela).6
For his own part, the man at the center of the storm, Kapolda Irjen Firman Gani, 
insisted that the renovations did not rely on external funding. However, he added, if 
the new buildings were funded through donations, then donors would have signed 
contracts that verified their charitable intentions. It wasn't as if they were trying to 
influence or "bribe" the police in any way.7 In later comments, Gani blessed those 
"servants of God who cared about security." He said that Polri's benefactors were men 
of piety and humility who guarded their anonymity. They weren't the types to seek 
vulgar public attention by declaring their donations.8
Seasoned observers and the press, however, wondered openly whether the 
renovated facilities had been built within the boundaries of Griya Yatra's SCBD site, 
insinuating that the land, and, by extension, some of Polda Metro Jay's renovations, 
had been funded by Oei.9 10The police's coffee-table book, released after the media 
storm, is more pointed than Bachtiar and Gani in its acknowledgements of benefactors. 
It thanks a consortium of ethnic Chinese-owned real estate and construction 
businesses, including Tony Oei (Griya Yatra), Alex Guo (PT Mandiri Ditpacipta and PT 
Multi Griya Pratama), Soetjipto Nagaria (Summarecon), Hary Tanusoedibjo 
(Bimantara group), and Suwarno M Serad (part of Budi Hartono's PT Djarum). Within 
Jakarta's ethnic Chinese community, these men are envied as lauipan, or "big boss."
In 2005, the year the coffee-table book was released, the Supreme Audit Agency 
(BPK, Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan) raised more questions about Metro Jaya's 
financing."'The BPK noted significant variations in Polri's financial reports to the 
agency compared to the documents compiled by Polri's own logistical bureaus (biro 
logistiks). BPK's audit singled out errors in the Polda Metro Jaya balance sheet, 
specifically the omission of land worth some Rp 12 586.79 billion, building and 
infrastructure improvements worth Rp 63.83 billion, and a further Rp 38.58 billion in 
undeclared equipment and vehicles.11
The BPK was careful to underscore that the discrepancies in financial reporting 
were not unique to the Jakarta regional police. In fact, the BPK actually praised Metro 
Jaya as one of only three regional stations to have ever submitted data to the audit 
body, or, for that matter, to have undertaken routine financial reporting at all. 
Nevertheless, the report suggested that fiscal discrepancies and undeclared wealth 
underpinned Polri's very existence. For instance, 2,700 hectares of land, some 82 
percent of the land in Polri's use, is undocumented.12 In 2004 alone, a year in which
6 Ibid.
7 Tempo Interaktif, "Polda Metro Jaya Bangun Gedung Densus 88 Anti-Teror," September 8, 2004,
http:/ / www.tempo.co/read/news/2004/09/08/05747669/ Polda-Metro-Jaya-Bangun-Gedung-Densus- 
88-Anti-Teror, accessed September 6, 2013.
8 "Hamba Tuhan di Gedung Anti-terror," Tempo Interaktif, December 27, 2004.
9 Police analyst, interview with the author, Jakarta, November 17, 2006.
10 "Hasi 1 Pemeri ksaan Laporan Keuangan Kepolisian Republik Indonesia Tahun 2004," Badan Pemeri ksa 
Keuangan (audit report), Jakarta, Government of Indonesia, 2005.
11 Ibid.
12 This is an area roughly the same size as the borough of Westminster, or inner-city London.
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Polri's portion of the national budget was some Rp 7.9 trillion (as shown in Table 2), 
Polri had generated undocumented assets from grants and donations to the tune of Rp 
163.13 billion, or about 2 percent of its budget. BPK stumbled on these figures because 
of discrepancies in the data submitted by different departments of the police force. This 
shows how dependent the state auditor is on institutional reporting to identify 
discrepancies. In fact, these figures represented only the tip of a monstrous fiscal 
iceberg, a mostly invisible off-budget economy that sustains the national police force.13
In 1999, in one of the first steps of democratic security sector reform, the Indonesian 
National Police were separated from the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI, 
Tentara Nasional Indonesia). This institutional split reflected a major shift in the 
traditional balance of authority between military and police. Under the New Order, the 
military, principally the army, usurped the police's functional role as a provider of 
security and defender of law and order. With the fall of the New Order, the police's 
authority over law and security has been reinstated. However, democratic reform of 
the Indonesian military has been mixed. The TNI continues to wield political power, 
and the army continues to have a presence in everyday security activities, although 
now it is secondary to Polri.
One important arena for military power during Suharto's rule was the considerable 
economic stake TNI officers had in local economies, which provided a substantial 
portion of their budget and income. Such undocumented fund-raising was justified by 
resource deficiencies. Throughout the New Order and into the democratic era, the 
police and the military have argued that their budgetary allocations do not reflect their 
actual workload. This ongoing situation has spawned what is called the off-budget 
economy: a vast, convoluted range of revenue-raising practices, both illicit and licit, 
that funnel unaccountable sums of money to the security institutions.
This article has two aims. First, I will examine the police's off-budget economy 
during and after the New Order. Current literature on off-budget revenue-raising by 
the military incorrectly subsumes police within the ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata 
Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Armed Forces, before the reinstatement of the TNI) 
complex. Not only did the police experience vastly different revenue-raising 
opportunities under ABRI relative to the military, but the independence of the police 
institution, the rise in its authority, and Polri's annual complaint that treasury funds do 
not adequately meet institutional expenses, opens up a considerable gap in the 
literature about police revenue-raising in the democratic period. I demonstrate how 
willful institutional and fiscal maladministration culminate in overwhelming resource 
deficiencies that legitimize and sustain the Indonesian police's off-budget economy. 
This contradicts conventional arguments that the off-budget economy is born of the 
poverty of the developing Indonesian state.
13 Indeed, I would venture that because these figures rely on the auditor's comparison between the sloppy, 
permissive inventories of wealth compiled by the MABES (Markas Besar, headquarters) logistics bureau 
and those sent to a hostile BPK, they are staggeringly understated and only haphazardly accurate. Not 
only does the BPK have no access to the financial reports of most of the provincial, district, and subdistrict 
stations, but what reports it does have are likely falsified. Moreover, the BPK cannot examine the accounts 
of individual officers, many of whom act as fiduciaries for donations later distributed to Polri in the form 
of operational funds or infrastructure.
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Secondly, I highlight the political economy of off-budget financing by spotlighting 
the considerable fiscal contribution that ethnic-Chinese capitalists have made to the 
off-budget economy of the military and the police. Here, I look at two types of 
structured alliances: joint enterprises between military generals and ethnic Chinese 
capitalists, and "friendships" between police generals and ethnic Chinese capitalists in 
the democratic period. These friendships are known as "parman," an acronym for 
partisipasi teman, or the "participation of a friend." What I call the "parman economy," 
the title of this article, is the hidden (secretive, invisible) flow of gifts, capital, and other 
commodities from ethnic Chinese capitalists that is channeled to police officers. 
Through the politics of land ownership in Jakarta's SCBD, I show how this pattern of 
rising police power and military withdrawal (short of retreat) that characterizes 
security sector reform in the democratic period, is also evident in the illicit world of 
off-budget financing.
Capital in the Off-budget Economy
Dana non-budjeter, or off-budget revenue, as an illicit source of finance to treasury 
funds, has an established history in the study of the Indonesian state.14 Here, the off- 
budget economy should be differentiated from the kind of independent, institutional 
revenue-raising that, since the 1980s, has become a hallmark of modern, neoliberal 
governance.15 In Indonesia, the state has encouraged and profited from institutional 
off-budget income-generation systems of varying legality, sophistication, and 
transparency, justified by the central assumption that APBN funds do not cover the 
"real" costs of expenditure on police and military forces. Meanwhile, little information 
is available publicly on the forms that off-budget financing takes. Off-budget revenues 
are not declared, audited, or returned to the state treasury, as per Indonesian laws on 
non-tax revenue.16 The absence of transparency allows the off-budget finances to be 
spent in a discretionary manner by institutional powerbrokers. Moreover, as long as 
state institutions are able to solicit monies externally, they are fiscally less dependent
14 See Leo Suryadinata, The Culture o f the Ethnic Chinese Minority in Indonesia (Singapore: Times Books, 
1997); William Ascher, "From Oil to Timber: The Political Economy of Off-Budget Development Financing 
in Indonesia," Indonesia 65 (April 1998): 37-62, http:/ /cip.cornell.edu/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0 
&verb=Display&handle=seap.indo/1106953919, accessed August 7, 2013; Ross McLeod, "Inadequate 
Budgets and Salaries as Instruments for Institutionalizing Public Sector Corruption in Indonesia,"
Southeast Asia Research 16,2 (2008): 199-223; Marcus Mietzner, "Soldiers, Parties, and Bureaucrats: Illicit 
Fund Raising in Contemporary Indonesia," Southeast Asia Research 16,2 (2008): 225-54; and Lex Rieffel and 
Karaniya Dharmasaputra, Tata Kelola Yayasan-Pemerintah: Ujian bagi Reformasi Birokrasi (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Freedom Institute, December 31, 2008), http: / / www.docstoc.com/docs/25724561/Tata-Kelola- 
Yayasan-Pemerintah-Ujian-bagi-Reformasi-Birokrasi, accessed August 8, 2013.
15 David Harvey, "From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance 
in Late Capitalism," Geografiska Annaler 71B (1989): 3-17.
16 Ross McLeod, "Public Sector Accounting Reform at the Local Government Level in Indonesia," Financial 
Accountability and Management, forthcoming; Lesley McCulloch, "Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian 
Military in Business," in The Military as an Economic Actor, ed. Jorn Brommelhorster and Wolf-Christian 
Paes (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2003), pp. 94—123.
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on the state.17 This compromises the very coherence and structure of the state as we 
know it.18
Although off-budget financing is widespread throughout the Indonesian state, 
these practices have largely been associated with the Indonesian military.19 The 
military's off-budget economy traverses the history of the Indonesian state. During the 
revolutionary struggle against the Dutch, a localized system of tithing and taxation 
was established to fuel the military effort.2" These revenues were supplemented by 
informal activities such as smuggling, and the illicit trafficking of copra, rubber, and 
opium was also an important means by which the guerrilla war was financed. In the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, leading up to the New Order, Nasution's vision of an 
expanded social and political role for the military (dzvifungsi) transformed and 
expanded the formalized elements of the military's off-budget economy into a 
substantial commercial empire, as generals acquired prominent roles in nationalized 
Dutch companies. Military businesses peaked under the New Order, as ABRI 
leveraged its political weight to establish a large complex of joint enterprises, 
cooperatives, and foundations, any of which were not viable without political support, 
and all of which collapsed with the late-1990s financial crisis. The post-authoritarian 
period has been marked by changes to the laws on state fund-raising, and pressure on 
the government to take over military businesses and force TNI's dependence on the 
state budget. However, this proposed reform has been met with significant political 
foot-dragging.21
Scholars have remarked that a major problem in researching the military's off- 
budget economy has been the dearth of data that would enable quantitative 
estimations of the size of the off-budget economy and the depth of the budgetary 
shortfall.22 Under the New Order, it was suggested that the military acquired 70 
percent of its revenue from off-budget sources, an often-cited figure that has proved 
impossible for scholars to verify with any certainty.23 With the reforms of the post­
authoritarian era, former defense minister Juwono Sudarsono has estimated this figure 
to be around 30 percent.24 Yet contrary to this estimate, Mietzner suggests that the 
revenues of formal military businesses do not exceed US$20 million. This means that in
17 Mietzner, "Soldiers, Parties, and Bureaucrats"; Jorn Brommelhorster and Wolf-Christian Paes, "Soldiers 
in Business: An Introduction," in The Military as an Economic Actor, ed. Jorn Brommelhorster and Wolf- 
Christian Paes (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2003), pp. 1-17.
18 Jacqui Baker, "The Rhizome State: Illicit State Financing and the Fiscal Sociology of the Southeast Asian 
State," paper presented atEUROSEAS, Lisbon, Portugal, July 3, 2013.
19 Mietzner, "Soldiers, Parties, and Bureaucrats."
20 Salim Said, The Genesis o f  Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945-49 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 1991).
21 Human Rights Watch, "Too High a Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military's Economic 
Activities," Human Rights Watch 18,5C (2006). See also Mietzner, "Soldiers, Parties, and Bureaucrats."
22 See Mietzner, "Soldiers, Parties, and Bureaucrats"; Human Rights Watch, "Too High a Price"; and Lex 
Rieffel and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, Out o f Business and On Budget: The Challenge o f Military Financing 
in Indonesia (Washington, DC: Brookings Freedom Institute, 2003).
23 Ibid.
24 Mietzner, "Soldiers, Parties, and Bureaucrats," p. 236.
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2008, the TNI's revenue from formal businesses made up only 0.5 percent of the 
defense budget.25
Material presented in the latter part of this article on Polri's off-budget economy 
suggests that questions concerning budgetary shortfall and the surrogate role of off- 
budget financing are redundant and represent an erroneous attempt to analyze the off- 
budget economy with the rational, normative lens that scholarship applies to formal 
budgeting and financing systems. These assumptions comply with the generals' refrain 
that off-budget revenues are directed towards the operational costs of the institution. 
Off-budget financing should not be understood as a parallel revenue system, subject to 
the same norms of accountability, transparency, priority, and distribution that govern 
the use of treasury funds. It's not that the off-budget economy is like a "normal," 
rationalized financing system, except that it is illicit. Spending on "institutional costs" 
is part of but not the principal way in which off-budget revenues are exhausted. 
Rather, the off-budget economy needs to be seen as the corresponding system of 
tribute, accumulation, and reward that services the political life of the institution that 
determines promotions, rotations, and the division of authority. Though subterranean 
and complex, the politics of Polri is the single greatest concern of an ambitious officer. 
Given this situation, the off-budget economy operates according to multiple, often 
contradictory logics including reciprocity, reward, seniority, entrepreneurship, 
kinship, charismatic power, and the "ethics" of personal wealth.26 Officers may 
negotiate, subvert, or transgress these logics outright, but they are nonetheless 
important to the off-budget economy's workings and endurance.
Typologies of military business tend to be largely organized by gradations of 
legality, rather than value, organizational structure, or governmental tier, all of which 
vary greatly. Off-budget financing of the military is divided into four main categories:
1) Legitimate companies overseen by military foundations (yayasan) or 
cooperatives (kooperasi) operating across a vast range of economic sectors, 
including transportation, manufacturing, natural resources, and agribusiness. 
This category includes joint enterprises with foreign companies, Suharto family 
members, or ethnic Chinese elites.
2) Gray-area or informal business enterprises, such as commercializing state 
assets or authorities (e.g., renting military land; selling used government 
property); requiring regular (but nonetheless dubious) security payments of large 
private companies, such as Freeport; or cultivating special relationships with 
state owned enterprises, such as Pertamina (Perusahaan Energi Indonesia, 
formerly Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara, State Oil and 
Natural Gas Mining Company), Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik, Indonesian 
Bureau of Logistics), or, formerly, Bidakari.
3) Illegal business activities in the vice economies of gambling or prostitution, or 
providing fee-based protection to illegal logging and smuggling rackets.
25 Ibid.
26 Jacqui Baker, "The Devil's Money is Eaten by His Lesser Demons: The Ethics of Illicit Police Financing in 
Indonesia" (forthcoming).
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4) Blatant corruption, including procurement markups, misusing foundation or 
cooperative funds, or enacting and enforcing illegal levies and fees.
This article focuses narrowly on a subset of the first type of military financing: joint 
enterprises with ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs. In fact, most military-run companies 
have operated under shared ownership, principally with ethnic Chinese 
entrepreneurs.27 There are two interrelated reasons for this, rooted in the historical 
structures of discrimination and political segregation that have marked ethnic Chinese 
citizenship from the time of the early colonial regime. Firstly, ethnic Chinese business 
groups dominate medium and large-scale corporate capital and own the majority of 
private capital. Secondly, decades of periodic, state-sanctioned, anti-Chinese sentiment 
have ensured that ethnic Chinese are security-poor despite their being capital-rich.28 To 
"secure" persons, property, and livelihoods, ethnic Chinese under the New Order were 
encouraged to seek out alliances with indigenous politico-bureaucrats who controlled 
the system of political patronage. Military officers, as important figures of coercive and 
political power, provided an umbrella of protection for ethnic Chinese property, assets, 
and livelihoods in exchange for material benefits for officers and the military 
institution. Colloquially, this relationship is known as "cukongism,"29
Cukongism is often erroneously compared to a patron-client relationship, however, 
this kind of power dynamic does not fit with the overall position of ethnic Chinese 
within Indonesian state and society.30 There is no doubting that ethnic Chinese 
capitalists benefited substantially from their alliances with the state, but few have 
interrogated the stakes that would have been involved if ethnic Chinese had refused 
such partnerships. Mutually beneficial exchanges were often underlined by the threat 
of coercion.31 Christian Chua argues that these symbiotic relationships contributed to 
the development of a complex "oligarchy" consisting of political powerbrokers and 
capital-rich ethnic Chinese who dominated the New Order and its signature style of 
predatory capitalism.32 Chua contends that the fall of Suharto's military regime and the 
processes of democratization, decentralization, and deregulation that have marked the 
post-authoritarian period have effectively emancipated ethnic Chinese business from 
the politico-bureaucratic class. He predicts that democracy will encourage the 
unfettered rise of capital. The implications of this article contradict and complicate 
Chua's argument. The "parman economy" I describe suggests that, despite their new­
found "liberty," ethnic Chinese capitalists continue to seek out potent protective 
relationships with the dominant coercive body. The reasons for this are complex and
27 Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise o f Capital (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2009).
28 Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2006).
29 Leo Suryadinata, The Culture o f the Ethnic Chinese Minority in Indonesia. Suryadinata explains that the 
word cukong is Hokkien for "master" or "boss," and the term has long been used to describe aggressive 
business entrepreneurs who often acted as informal leaders for certain parts of the ethnic Chinese 
community. Only in the New Order did cukongism come to represent a set of relations in which ethnic 
Chinese businessmen provided capital and directional support to the pribumi political and military elite in 
exchange for economic, political, and security privileges, to the detriment of the public interest.
30 Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, p. 21.
31 Ascher, "From Oil to Timber," pp. 54—60.
32 Christian Chua, Chinese Big Business in Indonesia: The State o f  Capital (London and New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2008).
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beyond the scope of this article. Interview data presented here, however, suggests two 
possible areas of inquiry. Firstly, that outright coercion has played an 
underappreciated role in the forming of these alliances, and, secondly, that history, 
memory, and belief play a significant role in these exchanges, and interpretations 
acknowledging such forces trump narrow political-economy analyses of the behavior 
of capital.
Militarized Business Alliances in the New Order
Officially, Polda Metro Jaya is adjacent to Lot #1 of the forty-two hectares of prime 
real estate that make up the Sudirman Central Business District. Zoned between three 
of the city's main arteries—Jalan Sudirman, Jalan Rasuna Said, and Jalan Gatot 
Subroto—the area is marketed as "Jakarta's Golden Triangle." Alongside Metro Jaya's 
recent property expansion, the Golden Triangle is home to the Jakarta Stock Exchange, 
the World Bank offices, USAID, Tan Kian's Ritz Carlton, a series of exclusive serviced 
apartments built by PT Raya Sedayu (another property group jointly owned by Oei 
and Guo), a golf range, an auto and electronics mall, a bagel shop, and Pacific Place, 
another of Jakarta's lifestyle malls. In 2020, SCBD's landscape will be augmented by 
the Signature Tower, the world's fifth tallest building.
When viewed from Jalan Sudirman, the Griya Yatra building (with its flaxen 
initials winking over the city) appears to be staked before this hoard of skyscrapers like 
a picket in turf. Griya Yatra is the mother company to PT Danayasa Griyatama, the 
holding company that owns, develops, and manages the upscale properties that 
proliferate in SCBD's golden triangle.33 PT Danayasa Griyatama is also owned in part 
by Alex Guo, owner of conglomerate Raya Sedayu Group. In 1990, PT Danayasa 
Griyatama surprised financial observers by acquiring a majority share in a state-owned 
company (BUMN, Badan Usaha Milik Negara) called PT JT Jakarta International Hotel 
Development (PT JIHD). With funds from PT JIHD, PT Danayasa Griyatama 
proceeded to pay Rp 7.5 trillion in 1991 for the SCBD site, then a "fantastical sum" for 
real estate even in central Jakarta.34 In 1999, Human Rights Watch valued the property 
at an estimated three billion US dollars.35 Previously, neither Oei nor Guo had ever 
managed a property deal that came even close to that sum.36
The scale and grandeur of the SCBD project was even more surprising given PT 
JIHD's middling property portfolio, which then consisted of a handful of luxury, if 
outdated, hotels in Jakarta and Kuta. How could such a pedestrian property firm 
plunge into the city's biggest-ever real estate deals? The answer lay in the company's 
origins. PT JIHD was, in fact, one of dozens of subsidiaries grouped under PT Tri
33 The name of the company has been changed for publication. Below this company are nineteen other 
subsidiaries involved in tourism, luxury housing, retail, real estate, trading, and construction. Most of 
these companies have a stake in the SCBD.
34 Dwitri Waluyo, Asrori S. Karni, and Rohmat Haryadi, "Bisnis Taipan Beragam Stigma," Gatra, March 17, 
2003, http:/ / www.gatra.com/2003-03-17/ versi_cetak.php?id=26297, accessed August 7, 2013.
35 Human Rights Watch, "Too High a Price."
36 Coincidentally, in the year of the SCBD purchase, Guo's Raya Sedayu group completed its first big 
construction project, the Harco Mangga Dua complex in Central Jakarta.
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Usaha Bakti (Truba), a holding company of Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi (YKEP, Kartika 
Eka Paksi Foundation), which during the New Order was the Indonesian army's 
largest foundation. Established in 1972, YKEP developed a vast investment portfolio 
that spanned forestry, manufacturing, mining, transportation, university education, 
and, later, as just described, the diamond in its tiara that was SCBD. Thus, PT JIHD and 
PT Danayasa Griyatama's interest in the Golden Triangle resulted from a marriage of 
military capital and ethnic Chinese business acumen. The land in the SCBD allegedly 
"gifted" to Polda Metro Jaya in 2004, was, in 1991, an emblem of the alliance between 
Jakarta's new ethnic Chinese tycoons and the army under late New Order capitalism.
The deepening relationship between the foundation and the conglomerate had 
been affirmed by the earlier appointment of Siliwangi officer Lieutenant General TB 
Silalahi to First Commissioner of PT Danayasa Griyatama and Bank Griya Yatra.37 
Silalahi was the first in a procession of senior military figures to hold commissioner 
status in the GY empire. Officially, the military commissioners on the GY board were 
there to monitor YKEP's stake in the partnership, but the effect of their association was 
to demonstrate that the company enjoyed military protection from the highest levels, 
thus catapulting forward the company's commercial dealings.
By creating such military-commercial alliances, YKEP and Griya Yatra were 
merely aping the historical pattern of revenue-raising established by Suharto himself. 
In 1957, as head of Central Java's Diponogoro military command, Suharto had 
partnered with Semarang's large ethnic-Chinese trader class to establish business 
interests in primary commodities and shopping, generating revenue that could then be 
channeled through a host of military foundations and cooperatives. Although the 
commercial activities were, in principle, for "troop welfare," senior staff were 
rewarded with placements in state and private enterprises that yielded them, 
personally, a share of the profits. Suharto was rotated from the Diponogoro post in 
1959 on accusations of corruption. As president, however, Suharto instituted this self­
same model of joint partnerships to generate wealth for the indigenous political and 
security elite. As the president's greed accelerated, so did the fortunes of choice ethnic 
Chinese capitalists, most notably his old Semarang crony Liem Sioe Liong (later 
reported to be the richest man in Indonesia). The New Order also saw the rise of other 
lau-pan, including Mochtar Riady, Sjamsul Nursalim, Prajogo Pangestu, Sukanto 
Tanoto, Eka Tjipta Widjaya, and Rachman Halim. Oei and Guo's emergence in the final 
years of New Order capitalism added two new big bosses to this list.
However, the economic landscape was changing and with it the inner dynamics of 
the oligarchy. By 1991, the year of the SCBD purchase, liberalization and selective 
deregulation were profiting both ethnic Chinese and politico-bureaucrats. The capital 
base of the politico-bureaucrats had fattened considerably, decreasing their reliance on 
ethnic Chinese big business.38 Similarly, ethnic Chinese capitalists were edging into 
international markets and increasing their autonomy from the state. Reforms to the
37 One of the first ventures of the Oei-Guo-army triad was the takeover of Yayasan Siliwangi's Bank 
Propelat. By 1989, Bank Propelat was Rp 600 billion (US$67 million) in the red, thanks to corrupt lending 
practices and bad debts. Oei-Guo took on the bank, renamed it Bank Griya Yatra, and by 1992 Oei-Guo 
enjoyed a majority share. Yayasan Siliwangi had only a 40 percent stake in Bank Griya Yatra. Bank Griya 
Yatra is today one of the top commercial banking firms in the country.
38 Chua, Chinese Big Business in Indonesia, p. 55.
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banking sector saw a glut of banks open, as ethnic Chinese conglomerates sought to 
increase their liquidity. With inflation and interest rates equally paired, a property 
boom ensued. Up to 25 percent of all lending during this time was directed at large- 
scale property projects, the largest of which was SCBD.39 Chua argues that the long­
term effect of these neoliberal reforms, coupled with the collapse of the New Order, 
would radically change the power balance between ethnic Chinese big business and 
state elites.40 Oei and Guo's sudden break into the top league of Jakarta laupan 
represented, in fact, one of the final alliances between ethnic Chinese capitalists and 
the security elite.
Joint enterprises were at the crux of the YKEP empire. Although it was YKEP's 
most expensive project, the SCBD initiative was only one of twenty-six other joint 
ventures under its holding company, PT Truba. At its height, PT Truba oversaw 
thirteen affiliated firms and twenty-six joint ventures, worth a total of Rp 314 billion.41 
Partners included Suharto cronies and ethnic Chinese businesspeople. PT Truba's 51 
percent share in International Timber Corp was shared with Bob Hasan (35 percent) 
and Suharto's third son, Bambang Trihatmodjo (14 percent). Hasan and Suharto's 
youngest son, Tommy, also partnered with PT Truba through Sempati Air and Truba's 
timber interests in Kalimantan, jointly held with ethnic Chinese entrepreneur Jos 
Soetomo, through PT Sumber Mas. In 1996, PT Truba was 140th on the list of 
Indonesia's biggest conglomerates.42
Joint enterprises masked the fact that, on their own, military businesses tended to 
be under-capitalized, ill-structured, and poorly managed. Ethnic Chinese 
entrepreneurs offered the military a way of turning "political resources into real 
profits."43 Robison shows how the military used its political clout to lever logging and 
mining concessions with very small sums of investment, around Rp 2-3 million. 
Production would languish until the military negotiated joint ventures with ethnic 
Chinese businesses that supplied the project with capital and the expertise to manage 
it. Robison has proposed that, in fact, the military's investment in the partnership was 
the very concession itself. Military officers provided only the security and prestige of 
partnership in return for a cut of profits. This helped maintain a military-enterprise 
system that would have collapsed far earlier than it eventually did had it been entirely 
self-financed and -managed.
With capital steering military commerce, it's unsurprising that military businesses 
mimicked the strategies and structures of ethnic-Chinese-owned conglomerates: 
random diversification around a series of vertically integrated cartels that supplied a
39 Joe Studwell, Asian Godfathers (London: Profile Books, 2007). Many of these projects involved the 
construction of the kind of large-scale, gated residential developments that have transformed Jakarta's 
urban landscape, intensified spatial segregation, and changed the face of traditional security arrangements.
40 Chua, Chinese Big Business in Indonesia, p. 58.
41 Rieffel and Pramodhawardani, Out o f Business, pp. 30-31. The profits of YKEP brought in around Rp 30- 
50 billion (US$300,000-500,000]) per year. Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, "The Sociology of Military Business in 
Indonesia," in Practices o f Military Business: Experiences from Indonesia, Burma, Philippines, and South Korea, 
ed. Mochtar Nurhasim (Jakarta: The Ridep Institute and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005).
42 Tom McCawley, "Bullets and Bottomlines," Asiaweek.com, undated, http://edition.cnn.com/ 
ASIANOW/asiaweek/99/0205/bizl.html Accessed September 6, 2013
43 Robison, Indonesia: The Rise o f Capital, p. 256.
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core cash flow.44 In the signature style of most ethnic Chinese conglomerates, YKEP 
raised enough capital to allow it to dominate entire production chains.45 Vertical 
integration allowed YKEP to determine how much profit and loss showed up on the 
books, diverting funds so that companies appeared less wealthy than they actually 
were or obscuring the profits being siphoned into officers' pockets. With "too much 
easy cash and too much easy credit,"46 YKEP diversified in order to establish more 
monopolies in other sectors of the economy rather than work at building dedicated, 
competitive companies with maximized earnings. Joe Studwell observes that this is a 
classic symptom of "a license-based operating environment in which competition is 
limited by the state and so any new business opportunity is to be grabbed at."47 But if 
we examine YKEP strategy through a slightly different lens, one that does not focus 
exclusively on economic factors, we develop a picture that is more revealing. This was 
a kind of predatory capitalism driven by a grinding anxiety about the temporal and 
political limits of empire-building. Vertical integration and random diversification 
evidence the plunder mentality that emerges in a precocious patrimonial system.
The nationalization of industry in 1957 saw military officers take on important roles 
as advisors, commissioners, and managers of state companies. With the expansion of 
joint enterprises involving the army and ethnic Chinese capital, senior and retired 
army officers filtered into cushy positions within the wider web of ethnic-Chinese- 
owned conglomerates. From here, military generals performed a largely theatrical role. 
For ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, demonstrating beking (backing, support) through 
close association with the military was critical to effecting the security that 
businesspeople craved. A military official appointed to the board of directors 
suggested to circling extortionists (usually rival generals) and business competitors 
alike that "this guy's not to be trifled with. He's got a general."48 Ethnic Chinese spoke 
to me repeatedly of the need, not to align with or engage, but specifically to "tempel" 
(to plaster or affix) a general to their conglomerates, as if the officer were a potent 
talisman. On the part of the generals-turned-commissioner, it was increasingly unclear 
whether officers were there to represent military business interests or increase their 
personal wealth.
Sibling Rivalry
In 1972, the year YKEP was created, the navy and air force also established their 
own vehicles for off-budget fundraising. Well known among them was the navy's 
Yayasan Bhumyamca, which had around thirty-two companies in 2000, and the air 
force's Yayasan Adhi Upaya, whose ten companies were invested in construction, 
property, airlines, and pharmaceuticals.49 The air force's PT Angkasa Pura also held a 
major stake in the commercial and state airline industry.
44 Studwell, Asian Godfathers.
45 Retired Police General, interview with the author, Jakarta, April 11, 2007.
46 Studwell, Asian Godfathers, p. 82
47 Ibid.
48 Interview with the author, Jakarta, April 6, 2007.
49 Human Rights Watch, "Too High a Price," pp. 35-36
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Table 1: Subsidiaries of Yayasan Brata Bhakti50
Yayasan Brata 
Bhakti (Brata 
Bhakti Foundation) Ownership
Profit
2007
Dividends
2007
Bara Induk
YBB owns 20% share. PT used to have 
HPH (hak pengusahaan hutan, forest 
concession rights) for approx. 180,000 
hectares in Serang (Maluku), Riau, and 
North Sumatra. Accused of illegal log­
ging in national forests in Riau and North 
Sumatra. HPH not renewed in 2003.
N/A Rp 700 million(US$79,000)
Tana Trisna
90% share. Industrial feeders, cold 
storage, Polri supplies, shrimp, timber, 
chemical supplies.
N/A N/A
Panca Trisna 90% share. General trading and supplier to Polri
Rp 1 billion 
(US$112 million)
Rp 500 million
(US$56,000)
Braja Tama 
(Karangsetra)
90% share. HPH in West Kalimantan; 
hotel and swimming pool in Bandung.
Rp 1 billion
(US$112 million)
Rp 480 million
(US$56,000)
Braja Tara 90% share. General trade and explosive equipment
Rp 20 million
(US$2,300) N/A
Brata Sarana 
Bhakti 90% share. Construction. N/A N/A
Asuransi Bhakti 
Bayangkara
51% share. Insurance company. Polri's 
traffic directorate illegally extracts a Rp 
30,000 levy for insurance from PT ABB 
for driver license applicants.
Rp 2.1 billion 
(US$235 million)
Rp 600 million
(US$67,000)
Sapta Pirsa 
Mandiri
35% share. Loss adjustment and 
surveying. N/A N/A
Sekom Bayangkara
(2001)
35% share. Subsidiary of Japanese 
company, Secom Ltd Security guards 
and equipment. In 2009, the company's 
estimated value was up by 15%.
Rp 1.25 billion 
(US$140 million)
Rp 400 million
(US$45,000)
Citra Graha Lestari 
Persada (1999)
55% share. Storage and parking at 
Samsat, Dan Mogot.
Rp 130 million
(US$15,000)
Rp 40 million
(US$4,500)
Bimantara
Building
In 2007, owned by YBB. Now appears 
to be owned by Hari Tanoe, through 
PT Bimantara Citra.
US$20,000 per 
year donation
(sumbangan tetap)
Rp 73 million
(US$8,200)
As the youngest sibling of ABRI, Mabes Polri's efforts to intercept state and private 
commerce were channeled mainly through Yayasan Brata Bhakti (YBB). Established in 
1952, YBB is, ironically, the oldest of all the foundations of the coercive apparatus. 50
50 Yayasan Brata Bhakti, interview with the author, Jakarta, April 24, 2008.1 am indebted to Karaniya 
Dharm Asaputra for his guidance during this interview. My figures have been checked against his in 
Rieffel and Dharmasaputra, Tata Kelola Yayasan, p. 40.
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Today, YBB oversees around ten trade, insurance, and forestry companies (see Table 1, 
above).51
Now regulated by the Foundation Laws of 2004, YBB no longer raises capital 
through partnership with the private sector, although its activities continue to be 
heavily controlled by the Kapolri, Wakapolri (Wakil Kapolri, Deputy National Police 
Chief), and Irwasum. Police officials at YBB argue that the foundation no longer 
operates as a "mask" (topeng) for Polri's business interests and insist that most of the 
companies under its auspices are idle or unprofitable.52
YBB's commercial activity shows that police companies by and large failed to 
attract the level of liquidity, diversification, and joint entrepreneurship of similar 
military organizations during the New Order. Most of the contracts Polri entertained, 
like transportation for Bulog or migrant workers, were just a sliver of a much more 
lucrative industry muscled out of the state economy. Polri failed to piggyback on 
ethnic Chinese capital to build vertically integrated cartels in the style of YKEP.
Similarly, by the time Suharto fell, active and retired Polri officers were absent from 
the executive boards of ethnic Chinese conglomerates, suggesting that here, too, the 
most powerful Polri staff still lacked the clout needed to benefit from the richest prizes 
of the security sector's off-budget economy. Since Polri was effectively the youngest 
sibling in a military state, partnering with the national police offered Chinese 
capitalists minimal protective power and limited fiscal return. What good was a police 
general on the board when he could be so easily trumped by an army general? Polri, in 
the New Order, was a poor man's talisman. Democratization was to change all of this.
Polri's Fiscal Organization
Following the dissolution of ABRI and establishment of Polri's independence in 
1999, the police regained control over domestic security and law enforcement. More 
importantly, from Polri's perspective, the generals had their institution back. For the 
first time in thirty-two years, Polri had complete authority over its own systems of 
education, recruitment and promotion, and budgeting. The independence of Polri was 
marked by a pledge of institutional reform by Polri's top brass.53 However, the pattern 
of political compromise and alliance-building distinctive to Indonesia's transition from 
authoritarian rule meant that Polri emerged under the direct supervision of the 
president, unencumbered by other bureaucratic and public oversight measures. This
51 Yayasan Brata Bhakti, interview with the author, Jakarta, Apri I 24, 2008.
52 Ibid. Comparatively, however, YBB's self-stated income appears to be quite buoyant. In a recent 
comparison of yayasan managed by state departments, YBB is second only to Bank Indonesia (the central 
bank) in takings. So great is Yayasan Kesejahteraan Karyawan Bank Indonesia's (YKKBI, or the Prosperity 
Foundation of Employees of Bank Indonesia) Rp 5.3 trillion (US$590 mi I lion) yearly income that the 
researchers were unable to include it on the graph. Rieffel and Dharmasaputra, Tata Kelola Yayasan, p. 41.
53 "Reformasi Menuju Polri yang Professional," Markas Besar Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, 1999 
(government pamphlet).
The Parman Economy 137
presented Polri's generals with the unique power to determine the pace and scope of 
their own institutional reform.54 56
Budgetary authority had long been a source of friction within ABRI. ABRI assumed 
control of Polri's budgetary processes sometime after 1968, and with that the police's 
top brass found themselves shut out of fiscal decision-making processes. As the fourth 
brother of the security apparatus, Polri had been subject to the same kind of fraternal 
bullying, random plunder, and fiscal-hand-me-downs that characterize sibling 
relations everywhere. Polri was last on the receiving end of everything, from treasury 
funds to off-budget revenue-raising opportunities, causing resentment among its top 
leadership. Consequently, the restoration of Polri's budgetary authority and the power 
to calculate and annually request Polri's allocation of treasury funds are viewed by the 
police as two central victories of democratization.
For Polri, "fiscal reform" has been narrowly interpreted to mean the single task of 
increasing the institutional budget. As Table 2 shows, Polri has largely been successful 
in this task.
Table 2: Department of Defense/Polri Budget 2001-2011 (trillions of rupiah)00
Y ear 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Polri 5,3 5,5 6,4 8 12 17
MOD"0 7,864 14,308 19,876 21,712 20,829 23,923
Y ear (cont.) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Polri 22 23 25.7 29 39.78
MOD30 30,611 31,349 34,333 42,392 49,984
Polri's budget has increased by approximately 3,500 percent since the transition to 
democracy. The defense budget has seen a slightly larger increase of 4,200 percent, 
however, this sum covers the defense administration, the army, the navy, and the air 
force, all of which have significantly higher procurement costs than do the police.
Despite these gains, Polri representatives argue that the deficiency in state funds is 
undermining police professionalism and causing officers to fund raise for themselves 
to cover operational costs. This central idea has dominated public thinking on the issue 
of police financing for decades. The organization of the off-budget economy will be 
explored in the second part of this section. This first subsection asks whether, in fact, 
Polri's budget is deficient, and, if so, whether that deficiency is calculable. Questions
54 This is in comparison with other post-authoritarian police reform efforts, where reform is determined by 
political heads or bureaucratic leadership. Mercedes S. Hinton, The State on the Streets: Police and Politics in 
Argentina and Brazil (Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner, 2006).
55 Figures have been compiled from newspaper articles reporting the annual budget. As a result, they may 
be imprecise to the hundreds of thousands. Due to a lack of clear reporting, figures for Polri have been 
compiled from multiple news sources. Figures for TNI have been compiled from the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ 
milex database, accessed August 7, 2013.
56 The Ministry of Defense budget includes departmental costs as well as all funding for TNI's three 
branches: army, navy, and air force.
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having to do with institutional financing are not easily answered in this case. Though 
they are public documents, police audits are not readily available, nor are they 
attentive to the structural and cultural causes of fiscal discrepancies. There is little 
institutional data. This makes interviews insufficient as sources of information, as 
officers are unable to articulate the wider fiscal structure in which they work. This 
section relies principally on three sources of data: (1) a report by the University of 
Indonesia's economic and social research institute, LPEM (Lembaga Penyelidikan 
Ekonomi dan Masyarakat), concerning police finances that was commissioned in 2002 
by Partnership for Governance;57 (2) a 2007 police "Institutional Transformation 
Project" implemented by the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program (ICITAP),58 and (3) my own interviews with officers conducted between 2007- 
12. The LPEM-UI report highlighted a number of key problems concerning the 
organization, prioritization, and transfer of police public monies, which I will outline 
here. In 2004, a year after the LPEM-UI report was released, treasury made changes to 
the distribution and transfer of those monies on top of the budget increase Polri 
received that year. These changes should combine to produce greater liquidity in the 
police institution, however, my own work and the ICITAP report suggests that there 
are continuing problems with the request and circulation of treasury funds.
Firstly, the LPEM-UI report highlighted problems in the way the 2002 Polri budget 
was prioritized. It found that a full 25 percent of the police budget went to Mabes Polri 
and only 7 percent to the territorial apparatus. Moreover, of the total budget amount, 
salaries, infrastructure, and administration made up 90 percent of Polri spending. The 
LPEM-UI report implied that the disproportionate amount of funds channeled to 
police headquarters rather than the other stations, and to staffing over operational 
needs, had its roots in the centralized decision-making structure that differentiates the 
institution from civilian bureaucracy. Polri, like the military, is proud to be a 
"national" institution, and this pyramid structure was mirrored in its financial 
arrangements. When Polri became independent in 1999, Mabes replicated the selfsame 
militarized structure that had so disadvantaged the institution by enacting a 
centralized budgetary system that placed all the decision-making power in the hands 
of the Department of Planning and Development (Derenbang) at Polri headquarters. 
Not only did this structure fundamentally pervert the way that funding was allocated, 
but it meant that information about the budget was concentrated in the center. The 
LPEM-UI research showed that in 2002, 65 percent of polres (subdistrict station) officers 
and 85 percent of polsek (mayoral station) officers had never seen their allocated budget 
and had no idea how much they were allocated that year. Staff signed for allocations 
that they did not get. The report argued that the lack of transparency around budget 
allocations meant that Polri's top officials had considerable power and opportunity to 
change and skim from the formal budget.
” Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia, "Financial 
Mapping: Reformasi Berkelanjutan Institusi Polri Bidang Manajemen Keuangan dan Anggaran Laporan 
Tahap Akhir," Markas Besar Kepolisian Republik Indonesia dan Kemitraan Bagi Pembaharuan Tata 
Pemerintahan, Jakarta, 2003.
58 Indonesian National Police, US Department of State, US Department of Justice, and International 
Criminal Justice Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), Blueprint for Strengthening Polres and 
Polsek (Jakarta: ICITAP, 2007).
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Moreover, the new 1999 budgetary system was tiered so that financial transfers 
would flow down through every level of the command before reaching the requesting 
station. Unsurprisingly, this initial system saw significant pilferage at every level. 
When LPEM asked officers to estimate how much they thought was missing of their 
budget, staff at the provincial level stations guessed 15 percent, at the district level, 45 
percent. The subdistrict police stations reckoned the discrepancy between their actual 
funds and the funds that they received to be around 54 percent.
This hierarchical system of financing the command ensured that transfers were not 
only filched as they moved through the system, but, crucially, that they moved 
through Polri at a torpid pace. LPEM-UI's data estimated that transfers (not just of 
money but also of petrol and electricity subsidies) from Derenbang at Mabes to the 
distributing arm of the Polda took, on average, three to five weeks, and then an 
additional few weeks to get to the polres and then into the polsek. The report found that 
funding transfers proposed at the beginning of the financial year arrived in March or 
April, and those applied for in the last quarter of the financial year didn't arrive at all. 
While district and subdistrict-level stations experienced a deficiency in funds, 
congestion in the transfer system meant that up to 40 percent of Polri's budget banked 
up at Mabes and the provincial level stations, leading to a convulsion of crash 
spending in the last half of the financial year.
In 2004, this trickle-down transfer system was replaced with a decentralized system 
that saw budgetary allocations transferred directly from provincial level treasury 
offices to district police stations. District police stations then transfer monies to the sub­
district level. This has drastically increased the political clout of the district police chief. 
In some parts of Jakarta, the district station makes monthly transfers, a schedule that 
appears to have increased their liquidity, although subdistrict police chiefs stationed in 
other parts of the country complain that "the polres is eating up all the money."59 In one 
subdistrict station I visited, the chief of police said that two million rupiah of their 
monthly allocation was deducted by the district station to contribute to a "guest" 
fund.60 The 2007 ICITAP report surveyed all stations under the regional commands in 
Bali, East Java, and South Sulawesi. Its findings spotlighted the same issues of fiscal 
bottlenecks and budgetary misappropriations as highlighted by LPEM-UI. In ICITAP's 
interviews, many officers at the polsek level reported signing budget dispersal forms 
and not receiving the stipulated funds, or, sometimes, receiving no funds at all. 
Officers estimated that they were operating on less than half of their allocated funds.
The new system has not brought significant change to Polri's budgetary priorities. 
Indeed, in 2007, Polri only spent Rp 211 billion (US$24 million) of the Rp 18 trillion 
(US$2 billion) of their budget on actual law enforcement, or "operational" activities.61 
In a subdistrict station I surveyed in West Jakarta, the head of criminal investigations 
(reserse) argued that his budget was only enough to cover the costs of six investigations 
per year. "I get around a hundred cases per month. Should I just do all six cases in 
January and then take a holiday until December?" asked the department head.62 The
59 Sectoral Police Chief, Interview with the author, Jakarta, April 6, 2007.
60 Sectoral Police Chief, Interview with the author, Jakarta, September 24, 2012.
61 "Anggaran Polri Tak Rasional: Imbasnya Ditanggung Rakyat," Kompas, January 15, 2008.
62 Mid-ranking police officer, interview with the author, Jakarta, January 21, 2012.
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situation appears to be worse in the regions distant from Jakarta. In the dozens of 
subdistrict stations surveyed by ICITAP in Bali, East Java, and South Sulawesi, 
operational budgets were nil.
The unpredictability and inadequacy of funds meant that officers in both the 2002 
and 2007 surveys claimed they had chosen to carry out their duties and activities first 
and receive the tardy leftovers of proposed reimbursements later. To do operational 
work, officers said they were forced to fund raise. The LPEM-UI report divides off- 
budget funds into three main sources: parmin, or criminal sources; parmas, or 
"community" sources; and parman, funds from businesspeople or private enterprise.63 
Of the three categories of off-budget funding, the LPEM-UI report observed that:
... the role of the ... parman is given highest priority for the acquisition of 
supporting funds, from the perspective of both size and frequency ... The 
tendency to use the contributions [jasa] of parman is not just at the subdistrict 
level but also at every level of the command system, starting from district and 
provincial stations up to Mabes Polri.64
Parman gift-giving foots the bill for police operations, for equipment and 
infrastructure, and for the cost of transportation, including the purchase and 
maintenance of vehicles and motorbikes. The report noted that parman also involve 
gifts of hibah tanah (land endowments), including buildings, and these funds provide 
for their maintenance or renovation. The report suggested that, contrary to police 
statements, off-budget revenue-raising means that officers had little use for the 
government reimbursements when they turned up. This meant that reimbursements 
were considered "free money," to be used at the discretion of the summoning officer.
The LPEM-UI report wanted to give a sense of the parman economy's scale, and so 
interviewers asked officers at every level of the police command their level of 
dependence on off-budget financing. Those at the provincial and district level stations 
estimated that 60-70 percent of their budget came from parman sources.65 At the 
subdistrict stations, the figures were reckoned at over 95 percent. Broken down by 
station unit, figures were just as dramatic. The patrol unit (samapta) put the number 
somewhere between 80 and 90 percent, and, for criminal investigations, the figure was 
99 percent.
At the same time, the researchers asked officers to write mock, aspirational budgets 
that would fulfill their operational needs. Officers faltered at the task, unable to come 
up with line items beyond snacks and petrol. ICITAP's 2007 report noted that stations 
it surveyed did not collect or archive basic institutional data on budgets, workloads, 
operations, staffing, or local security needs. Without such categories, the report's
63 These are not hegemonic terms, and although most police officers recognize the acronyms, most would 
not use these forms of categorization. This typology also makes it unclear where some of the key 
enterprises of the police off-budget economy are situated in the scheme. For instance, selling Polri's 
subsidized fuel allowance is a major economy for Polri, as it was for the military, but how might this 
"gray" area trade be categorized?
64 LPEM-UI, "Financial Mapping," p. 15.
65 Ibid., Appendix 14.
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authors observed, stations cannot feasibly calculate how much money they would 
actually need to operate in a given year.bb
What this suggests is that stations are not rational institutions, deftly managing 
their treasury and off-budget funds to meet working needs. Stations are unable to 
identify what an institutional need is, let alone to possess the capacity and political will 
to calculate their needs and seek funding for them. This means that the parman 
economy is not a modest stopgap in an inefficient, developing-world fiscal system. 
Rather, the combination of willful neglect and maladministration has structured an 
institutional dependence on the parman gift economy as the single most important, 
and least accountable, revenue source at all levels of the territorial command. In the 
practical, everyday lives of Indonesia's 380,000-plus police officers,6 7 there is no 
economy outside of the off-budget economy. Of the different ways and means of illicit 
revenue-raising available to officers, exacting a "donation" from Indonesia's 
vulnerable, pariah, capitalist class is the most predictable, flexible, untraceable, and 
socially prized method of them all.
The Parman Economy
Such fantastical sums of money, capital, and resources form a vast interior current 
moving through the police institution, animating its everyday reasoning, its 
geographies, its stratagems, and its institutional considerations. The parman economy 
funds individual events, distinct posts, and units or notable officers. The parman 
economy underwrites choice drug and gambling busts, anti-terror exercises, 
community policing events, and intelligence gathering. Ethnic Chinese money also 
sponsors institution-building and knowledge-based exercises, such as seminars, 
meetings to draft model legislation, and networking events. A monthly stipend comes 
attached to individual posts and departmental units of certain authority, such as 
criminal research or intelligence, and to stations that guard Indonesia's ports, borders, 
gated residences, and industrial parks. Capital flows can also be invested in 
individuals, as a gifted stipend that notable officers receive for the duration of their 
careers.
Parman dividends are not subject to the moral constraints that govern the 
distribution of public revenue, which is accumulated and then redistributed. Rather, 
every unit, station, and department within Polri "works on its own, as if it were its 
own company."68 In a station, a resource deficient area (known as kering, or dry), such 
as education, cannot requisition funds from a resource rich unit (known as basah, or 
wet), such as criminal investigations. This means that parman monies pool in certain 
departments and units, leaving others depleted. Among Polri's ranks, talking about 
money, or the lack of it, is taboo. Station or unit heads delegate assignments without 
allocating funds. Monetary transfers arrive in sums much less than expected. For an
66 Interview with the author, Jakarta, February 13, 2007.
Dani Permana, "Jenderal Timur Pradopo: Personil Polri 387,470 Orang," Tribunnews.com, January 17, 
2012, http: / / www.tribunnews.com/nasional/ 2012/ 01 /17/jenderal-timur-pradopo-personil-polri- 
387.470-orang, accessed September 6, 2013.
68 Police general, interview with the author, Jakarta, November 6, 2006.
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officer schooled in the discursive decorum of Polri, it is unthinkable to raise this matter 
institutionally. The taboo against discussing money further atomizes the off-budget 
economy so that even the collective fund-raising of units and departments threatens to 
devolve further to individuals and factions. There is substantial capital, social and 
material, to be gained from the money taboo. The officer who courted the funds has 
autonomy over its spoils. "We don't have to be responsible for it, unlike the APBN," 
and therefore, the money is "easy come, easy go."69
Juniors who refrain from soliciting money vertically are identified as ikhlas; it 
shows they are prepared to sacrifice for the institution, stressed one middle-ranking 
criminal investigations (reskrim) officer.70 More importantly, displays of fiscal potency 
cloak officers in enigma and prowess, the production of which is a central tactic to 
gaining status within the force. Officers are almost singularly preoccupied with 
interpreting and decoding the actions and insinuations of their colleagues. It's what 
they speculate on well into the night. Allusions to an ethnic-Chinese benefactor inspire 
awe and envy.71 "Fulfilling my duties as an officer without asking for money is what 
makes me remarkable [hebatnya soya] in the eyes of authority," added the officer.72
The parman economy is also deeply and intractably gendered. Revenue-raising is 
an important part of an officer's responsibilities. Attracting parman funds is not always 
merely a matter of rank or position. It's about mobility and sociality. An officer must 
circulate and associate igaul) in important sub-state spaces, particularly nightclubs, golf 
courses, and particular karaoke bars. These are principally masculine spaces where 
relationships emerge through the mutual transgression of laws and norms: the "gift" of 
female escorts or the sharing of illicit substances. Female police officers, unwelcome in 
this unique realm, are shut out from this economy. Their inability or reluctance to 
perform this kind of corrupted sociability as a way of establishing fiscal viability, or 
mampu secara operasional (the state of being "operationally capable"), is what keeps the 
Polri top brass exclusively male.73
From Polri's perspective, meeting and maintaining a patron is considered by police 
superiors as an integral rite of passage and, as a rising officer circulates through 
postings and departments, he is expected to establish contacts and patronage networks 
that will serve the institution in the future. Entertaining good relations with ethnic 
Chinese backers is seen as so integral to the well-being of the institution that the social 
and professional life of an ambitious officer is organized around the bureaucratic 
itinerary of ethnic Chinese business figures. Postings in Jakarta, Medan, and Surabaya 
link officers to certain parman who will advance their careers. Because of this, the 
parman economy creates stark disparities among different geographic areas within the 
command, between territories dense with parman and those without. For instance, the 
LPEM-UI survey found that officers trained at AKPOL (Akademi Kepolisian, the 
police academy) clustered in areas rich in private capital, while graduates of the less 
prestigious SPN (Sekolah Polisi Negara, the National Police School) were stationed
69 Mid-ranking police officer, interview with the author, Jakarta, March 7, 2007.
70 Ibid.
71 Mid-ranking police officer, interview with the author, Jakarta, September 26, 2011.
72 Ibid.
73 Mid-ranking police officer, interview with the author, November 10, 2006.
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where there was minimal commercial activity.74 The parman economy is also critical 
for officers who wish to pursue higher education, such as the degree program at the 
Police Higher Education Academcy (Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian, PTIK), and the 
senior management courses at SESPIM (Sekolah Staf Pimpinan, School for Staff and 
Police Managers). At PTIK, one junior officer told me that he and every one of his 
classmates had their education sponsored by an ethnic Chinese.75
Access to liquidity brings greater mobility within the police institution. This is not 
just because officers supplement their salaries from the parman economy. Police 
postings, rotations, and promotions are often determined by cash bribes. Ethnic 
Chinese patrons supply the capital integral to the bidding and counter-bidding process 
required of police officers to circulate upwards into more lucrative or prestigious 
positions. Unsurprisingly, the parman economy affords ethnic Chinese capitalists 
significant sway over the promotions and postings of officers. At PTIK, young 
graduates solicited their next posting from ethnic Chinese capitalists who had the ear 
of those in the upper echelons.76 A former senior police commissioner with the police 
explained:
You can't be promoted or rotated without the ethnic Chinese [golongan Cina]. 
They have an incredible influence on postings. There are bribes he [the patron] 
must pay, and he'll also give facilities ... To become a kapolsek [subdistrict police 
head], you must have a patron. We don't have a merit system. This is why we 
have this system.77
Officers defend this kind of long-term benefaction, arguing that the predictability and 
stability of parman funds allow them to stay focused on "policing" rather than being 
trapped in the pursuit of less palatable, more unstable funds from criminal, parmin 
sources.
Parman funds also enable an officer to build a strategic network of support up and 
down the Polri hierarchy, by regifting the spoils of the parman economy to 
subordinates in exchange for loyalty. Such junior officers may be given cash bonuses 
for achieving policing goals, or introduced to a parman. By circulating the rewards of 
the parman economy, an officer is able to maintain discipline (disiplin), a sign of 
masculinized leadership at all levels of command. At the same time, parman funds 
help officers curry favor among their superiors by recirculating capital upwards as 
gifts or monthly payments. Visiting officers make up a third category of recipient. The 
gift economy for visiting officers is a substantial financial burden on local police. 
Guests must be supplied with petrol, escorts or "companions," drugs, nights out on the 
town, and cash envelopes (amplop) to see them safely on their journey. In one
74 Also see Jacqui Baker, "Sibling Rivalry," Inside Indonesia, August-December 2008, http: / / www. 
insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/a-sibling-rivalry, accessed August 13, 2013.
75 Junior-ranking officer, interview with the author, Jakarta, April 11 2007.
76 Ibid.
77 Retired Police General, interview with the author, Jakarta, November 16, 2006. It's important to note that 
human resources reform within Polri was, until 2007, a very important plank of institutional reform, 
precisely because of its critical link with the off-budget economy. Some reforms were implemented, but 
they have stopped short of ending the role of parman funds in rotations and promotions.
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subdistrict station I surveyed, the monthly "guest" fund was 40 million rupiah (about 
US$4,500).78
Polri's parman economy operates in the gray zone between licit and illicit, 
legitimate and illegitimate, individual and structural. By marrying the promise of 
individual wealth accumulation and career advancement with institutional needs, it 
occupies moral terrain within the state as illicit, but legitimate. It does this in ways that 
are complex and often asymmetrical, but morally defensible by its beneficiaries and 
according to the institutional structure in which they operate. As long as officers 
continue to negotiate an acceptable balance between personal wealth accumulation, the 
outward performance of legal and security functions, and the institution's important 
internal political relations of illicit exchange and transaction, which determine 
individual officers' advancement and influence, the parman economy will continue to 
form the basis of Polri's fiscal system.
The Democratic See-Saw
The fall of the New Order in 1998 was marked by unprecedented rioting that 
targeted ethnic Chinese enterprises. In their personal recollections of those riots, some 
ethnic Chinese capitalists reported having been protected by their military connections. 
Others had the bitter experience of being abandoned by their military ally or pressed 
for more gifts in their time of need. Either way, the very fact of such violence 
specifically directed against ethnic Chinese and the suspicion that military elements 
stoked the forces behind that violence dealt a staggering blow to the Chinese trust in 
the soldiers as their protectors.
Ethnic Chinese disenchantment with the military converged with wider political 
and structural reforms—such as ABRI's disbandment and the military's withdrawal 
from an explicit political role—to curb the military's power. The 2004 TNI law 
specified that military businesses would be subject to government takeover by 2009. 
This process, however, has been subject to subversion and delay, allowing the military 
to sell off valuable assets.79
In addition to the military's declining political influence, early in Indonesia's 
transition to democracy its joint enterprises were showing considerable signs of decay. 
Ernst and Young's 2001 audit of YKEP showed a capital structure on the verge of 
collapse from years of embezzlement, the Asian financial crisis, and the emergence of a 
more competitive market.80 In 2000, YKEP returned a net loss of Rp 8.21 billion (US$915 
million) and total contributions to the defense budget from the i/fli/flsfljz-cooperative 
economy slumped to 1 percent in 2000 and 0.7 percent in 2001.81 Although generals 
occupied strategic seats on the board of YKEP, either they had little operational 
influence or the foundation was listed as a non-cash partner in joint ventures. 
Indonesian Corruption Watch concluded from the Ernst and Young audit that YKEP's
78 Sectoral Police Chief, interview with the author, Jakarta, September 24, 2012.
79 Mietzner, "Soldiers, Parties, and Bureaucrats," p. 223.
80 Ibid. See also Human Rights Watch, "Too High a Price," p. 15.
81 Human Rights Watch, "Too High a Price," p. 15.
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various investments with Oei-Guo, in particular, did not favor military interests and 
that the generals had little bargaining power vis-^-vis their ethnic Chinese partners. 
Delays in regulating the foundations gave the generals a profitable exit. In 2005, Major 
General Kiki Syahnakri, a representative of YKEP who joined the bank as a 
commissioner in 2000, facilitated the sale of TNI's falling stake in Bank Griya Yatra for 
Rp 151 billion (US$16 million) without first seeking state permission.82 Oei- and Guo- 
owned companies ate up YKEP's share in PT JIHD, reducing military holdings in the 
company to small personal claims.
The rise of Oei and Guo and the demise of YKEP tallies well with Chua's argument 
that capital in Indonesia has been liberated from the politico-bureaucratic oligarchy 
since the fall of Suharto. However, Indonesia's unique democratization, with its 
attendant processes of decentralization and demilitarization, has fragmented political 
power and emboldened a new, variegated class of political elites who demand rites of 
tribute and reward similar to the exchanges that typified the New Order.83 The 
Indonesian National Police has been chief among this new, competing predatory class. 
The police's rise to power has been accelerated by reformasi's perverse preoccupation 
with legality (rather than the implementation of rule of law). Polri's power to 
distinguish between the illegal and the legal in an age when law has become the terrain 
upon which contemporary political and economic battles are fought has impelled 
capital's stampede to claim a police "friend." Thus, the distinct characteristics of 
Indonesian democratization coupled with security sector reform have unintentionally 
reorganized, rather than democratized, the state's coercive apparatus, and given teeth 
to a repressed younger sibling now looking to capitalize on its position after years of 
fiscal subordination. In this way, ethnic Chinese alliances with the military via joint 
enterprises have given way to an atomized and individualistic, but no less structured, 
partnership with the police.
How are these new relationships between capital and police initiated, organized, 
and displayed? As it was under the New Order, the performance of an alliance is 
critical to its effect. The protective benefits of a police ally are only activated with an 
audience. If in Suharto's time affixing a military general to the board of directors was 
integral to the theater of protection, in the democratic era, capital's turn to the police 
has been channelled through new citizenship activities now permitted for the ethnic 
Chinese community. After 1998, religious organizations, civic NGOs, and new media, 
have proliferated "like mushrooms after spring rain."84 This has included every type of 
organization and structure, from powerful national organizations such as INTI 
(Perhimpunan Indonesia Keturunan Tionghoa, the Association of Indonesians of 
Ethnic Chinese Descent), to local-level mini-parliaments, clan (marga) associations,
82 "Penjualan Saham TNI di Artha Graha Disorot," Bali Post, September 9, 2005, http: / / www.balipost. 
co.id/balipostcetak/2005/9/9/ n3.htm, accessed August 13, 2013.
83 Edward Aspinall, "The Irony of Success," Journal o f Democracy 21,2 (2010): 20-34. Edward Aspinall, "A 
Nation in Fragments: Patronage and Neoliberalism in Contemporary Indonesia," Critical Asian Studies 45,1 
(2013): 27-54. See also, Vedi Hadiz, "Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia," Development and 
Change 35,4 (2004): 697-98.
84 Mary Somers Heidhues, "Ethnic Chinese Voluntary and Involuntary Associations in Indonesia," in 
Voluntary Organizations in the Ethnic Chinese Diaspora, ed. Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce and Evelyn Hu-Dehart 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), p. 89.
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volunteer fire bridges, sporting groups, and charities established by a single 
conglomerate head, such as Guo's own Tzu Chi or Oei's Griya Yatra Peduli (Griya 
Yatra Cares). The bona fide charity work of conglomerate charity organizations rotates 
carefully among the constituencies and interest groups of new political elites, including 
the national police.
These activities are reported in ethnic Chinese media, which has experienced a 
parallel explosion since the fall of the New Order.85 In 2008, Ted Siong's International 
Daily News (Guo Ji Ri Bao) captured the Mandarin-speaking business elite with national 
distribution and a pro-China stance, after a rival paper, the pro-Taiwan Universal Daily 
News, folded. International Daily News's sister publication is National News, a daily, 
subscription-only broadsheet published in Bahasa. With a daily circulation of around 
fifty thousand, National News is sponsored by a number of ethnic Chinese capitalists 
who distribute the paper among their employees and in Jakarta police stations. 
Sponsors include Tony Oei's Bank Griya Yatra, Eka Cipta Widjaya's Sinarmas, Alex 
Guo's Raya Sedayu Group, Prajogo Pangestu's Barito Pacific, and Trihatma Guo 
Haliman's giant real estate enterprise Agung Podomoro. The newspaper also receives 
substantial contributions from regionally based corporations such as Maspion, 
Olagafood, and GRC Board (West Java). The Jambi ethnic Chinese community is also 
an especially strong financial backer of the paper.
The paper is edited by Mochtar Siahaan and Lee. The former, Lee explains, is a 
former journalist who has strong connections with the police. According to Lee, Ted 
Siong designed National Nezvs specifically to encourage relations between police and 
the ethnic Chinese business community. "We wanted to present a non-biased image of 
the police and give voice to them as they are not normally heard," observed Lee.86 True 
to Siong's aim, a number of pages in each issue of National News are dedicated 
exclusively to Polri. Typically, page five, entitled "Police Line," gives a positive spin to 
police operations and policies. A side column called "Police on My Mind" features 
attractive youth and their satisfied opinions about police conduct and the reform 
process. On page two, the National News presents its "Man of Today," a Polri officer of 
kapolres rank or above (see images, next page). The article details the officer's policing 
principles and past achievements, and specifies his telephone numbers. An officer's 
entire CV is published alongside photos of the officer's family and children.
The middle pages of the broadsheet consist of a high-color insert, picturing recent 
activities by ethnic Chinese social and religious organizations in a section entitled 
"Indonesia: I am in Love." Articles cover the opening of new Buddhist and Mandarin 
schools, corporate events, the elections within regional marga societies, and recent 
meetings with important politicians and police and military generals. Many ethnic 
Chinese social organizations undertake committed charity work, such as blood drives, 
donations of sembako (the nine basic necessities for living), health-check (wellness) 
drives, and fund-raising for Islamic schools, and invite local police to witness or 
present gifts along with their ethnic Chinese corporate sponsors. Other events focus 
explicitly on police policies, such as supporting anti-narcotics events.
85 Suryadinata, The Culture o f the Ethnic Chinese.
86 Lee, interview with the author, Jakarta, April 9, 2007.
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All reports of such events are accompanied by large color photographs with 
extended captions, printed in a bold font, naming key persons of the organization and 
their respective positions.
This kind of reporting is understood by other capitalists as "a show of force," or a 
type of "theater" (sandiwara).88 New ethnic Chinese media and civil society groups 
have provided the means for capital to seek protection, establish strategic friendships 
(can hubungan) with the police elite, and show them off (can imaj).89 One ethnic Chinese 
businessman observed, "under Suharto, the one thing we could do was give 
contributions [sumbang]. The way of the ethnic Chinese is still the way of the New 
Order, that is, sumbang."90
• • •
Off-budget funding continues to shape the life of state institutions in post­
authoritarian Indonesia. Here, I have shown how the power dynamics of 
democratization in the security sector have been echoed in the subterranean, illicit 
world of state off-budget financing. Ethnic Chinese capital, once earmarked exclusively 
for the military, has realigned itself with the police as that institution's political clout 
has risen. However, where structural alliances between capital and the military once 
took the ironclad form of a joint alliance, democratization has created the parman 
economy, a series of fragmented and atomized, but no less systematic, relationships 
that are even less subject to scrutiny. Without substantive fiscal and institutional 
reform to the police institution, ethnic Chinese funds will continue to finance Polri's 
complex, political life.
In the post-authoritarian era, the police are an economic actor under 
transformation. As the police's star rises, its entrepreneurial impulse strengthens. 
"Business, business, business, it's all about having a business," a grinning police 
general told me.91 Most officers I know have established small- and medium-scale 
personal businesses in the primary commodities and service sectors. They argue that it 
provides them with a flow of capital to support their political careers within the police. 
At the regional and district level, police maintain businesses that operate in total 
obscurity.92 Most recently, a low-ranking officer stationed in Papua has been 
investigated for illegal logging operations managed thorough two companies 
registered in his name. These companies saw over one trillion rupiah pass through 
their accounts over a five-year period. Will the emergence of personal police businesses 
eventually evolve into joint enterprises with ethnic-Chinese, who dominate private 
commerce?
More traditional forms of alliance and display have also emerged in this 
transformation of the police. Retired police generals are beginning to appear on the 
boards of known patrons of the police, including appointments to Nagaria's
ss Ethnic Chinese business owner, interview with the author, Jakarta, March 3, 2007.
89 Ibid.
90 Ethnic Chinese business owner, interview with the author, Jakarta, April 27, 2007.
91 Police General, interview with the author, Jakarta, November 17, 2006.
12 Retired Police General, interview with the author, Jakarta, April 31, 2008. Also, Police General, interview 
with the author, Jakarta, January 13, 2006.
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Summarecon, Sjamsul Nursalim's Gajah Tunggal, and Hari Tanoe's Bhakti 
Investama.93 Similarly, at the regional and local level, pensioned police officers are 
filling the boards of medium-size enterprises.94 Echoing this trend, police, as army 
generals did under the New Order, have also begun to infiltrate pribumi ("native" 
Indonesian) and state enterprises.95 High-ranking generals have taken up positions at 
Tommy Suharto's Humpuss and in state enterprises, such as PT Timah (the state's tin 
company operating out of Bangka Belitung) and PT Perkebunan Nusantara V (the state 
agricultural company specializing in fertilizer and now biodiesel). Whether these 
appointments represent the tendrils of the kind and scale of the army's economic 
empire-building under the New Order remains to be seen.
Glossary
Police Stations by Rank, descending
Markus Besar (MABES) Polisi -  National Police Headquarters
Polisi Daerah (Polda) -  Regional Police Station corresponding to provincial [propinsi] 
level government
Polisi Daerah (Polda) Metro Jaya -  Jakarta Regional Police Station for DKI [Daerah 
Khusus Ibu Kota Raya] Jakarta
Polisi Resort (Polres) -  District Police Station corresponding to district [kabupaten] level 
government
Polisi Sektoral (Polsek) -  Subdistrict Police Station corresponding to subdistrict
\kecarnatan \ level government
Police Schools By Rank
Sekolah Staf Pimpinan (SESPIM) -  School for staff and police managers 
Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian (PTIK) -  Police Higher Education Academy 
Akademi Kepolisian (AKPOL) -  Police Academy 
Sekolah Polisi Negara (SPN) -  National Police School
Police Positions by Rank
Kepala Polri (Kapolri) -  National Police Chief
93 Since 2006, Snr. Com. Posma Lumban Tobing had held a commissioner position in a range of companies 
under Hary Tanoe's control. In that same year, former Kapolri Dibyo Widodo was also appointed to 
President Commissioner of Gadjah Tunggal. In 2009, Irjen Edi Darnadi was appointed at Summarecon.
94 For instance, Irjen. (purn, retired) Logan Siahaan is the Independent Commissioner of Jakarta-based PT 
Asuransi Wanamekar Handayani, and former Kapolri Dibyo Widodo is President Commissioner of 
Jakarta property developer, FT Indonesia Prima Property and PT Panen Lestari Basuki.
95 In 2008, Brigadier General Karyono entered PT PNV after a career in Inkopol (Induk kooperasi 
kepolisian, the police's parent cooperative) and Irjen. Polisi Drs. Insmerda Lebang joined the board of 
commissioners at PT Timah. After stepping down from his position as head of the police in 2008, General 
Sutanto was appointed by the president to lead Pertamina, a position formerly held by distinguished 
heads of the TNI. In 2009, Irjen. Rubani Pranoto joined PT Petrokimia Gresik.
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Wakil Kepala Polri (Wakapolri) -  Deputy National Police Chief 
Kepada Polisi Daerah (Kapolda) -  Chief of the Regional Police 
Kepala Polisi Resort (Kapolres) -  Chief of the District Police 
Kepala Polisi Sektoral (Kapolsek) -  Chief of the Subdistrict Police
Police Agencies
Brigade Mobil (Brimob) -  Mobile Brigade
Detasemen Khusus 88 (Densus 88) -  Police Anti-terror squad
Inspektor Pengawasan Umum (Irwasum) -  General Oversight Inspectorate
Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia (Polri) -  National Indonesian Police
Reserse kriminal (reskrim) -  Criminal investigations
Samapta -  Patrol unit
Government Institutions and Terms
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) - The Indonesian armed forces before 
TNI was reinstated
Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (ABPN) -  State Budget 
Anggaran Belanja Tambahan (ABT) -  Additional Expenditure Budget 
Badan Pengawas Keuangan (BPK) -  Supreme Audit Agency 
Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN) -  State Owned Company
Badan Urusan Logistik (Bulog) -  Indonesian Bureau of Logistics (formerly Bidakari)
Komisi III -  National Parliamentary Commission III for Law, Human Rights, and 
Security
Perusahan Energi Indonesia (Pertamina) -  State Oil and Natural Gas Mining Company
Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI ) -  Indonesian National Armed Forces
Yayasan Adhi Upaya -  a foundation of the air force
Yayasan Bhumyamca -  a foundation of the navy
Yayasan Brata Bhakti YBB -  the largest national police foundation
Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi (YKEP) -  The largest army foundation during the New 
Order
PT Tri Usaha Bakti (PT Truba) -  a holding company for YKEP 
Research Institutes
ICITAP -  International Criminal Investigative Training Program
LPEM-UI -  Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat, Universitas Indonesia -  
University of Indonesia Institute for Economic and Social Research
